Bank merger policy and the new CRA data by Anthony W. Cyrnak
Bank Merger Policy and the New CRA Data
Anthony W. Cyrnak, of the Board’s Division of Re-
search and Statistics, prepared this article. Dennis W.
Campbell provided research assistance.
One consequence of the current merger trend in the
banking industry has been heightened interest in
the analytical framework and data used by federal
authorities to assess the competitive effects of bank
mergers and bank holding company acquisitions (see
box ‘‘Federal Antitrust Review of Bank Mergers’’).
Although the analytical methods used by the bank
regulatory agencies and the Department of Justice are
similar, some differences have emerged over time.
Two issues related to these differences can now be
examined using data collected for the ﬁrst time as a
result of 1995 changes in the regulations implement-
ing the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).
One of the issues is whether locally based commer-
cial banks and savings institutions (‘‘in-market’’
ﬁrms) face signiﬁcant competition in small business
lending from banks and savings institutions based
outside local banking markets (‘‘out-of-market’’
ﬁrms). This issue is important because, in the view of
some banking industry observers, the presence and
competitive inﬂuence of out-of-market ﬁrms in local
banking markets warrant greater recognition by bank-
ing regulators and the Department of Justice. If the
competitive role of out-of-market institutions were
more fully recognized, they argue, more banking
markets would be viewed as structurally competitive,
and bank mergers within these markets would raise
fewer antitrust concerns.1 The new CRA data can
shed some light on this issue by providing informa-
tion about the number of, and lending activity of,
out-of-market small business lenders in urban and
rural banking markets.
The other issue is whether levels of concentration
within U.S. banking markets differ signiﬁcantly when
measured by small business loan originations rather
than by bank deposits. Legal precedent and economic
theory have traditionally supported the use of total
bank deposits as the basis on which to calculate
market concentration. This practice has been reexam-
ined in recent years, however, as industry observers
have questioned whether competition in local bank-
ing markets might be better measured on the basis
of some other variable, notably loans to small busi-
nesses.2 Competition in small business lending, some
have argued, is more local than is competition for
deposits and better reﬂects the competitive realities
of local banking markets.
1. To simplify discussion, the term mergers hereafter refers to
both mergers of banks and acquisitions of banks by bank holding
companies.
2. See, for example, ‘‘Are Deposits the Best Antitrust Measure?’’
Bank Mergers & Acquisitions, vol. 12 (December 1997), pp. 1–4.
Federal Antitrust Review of Bank Mergers
All proposed mergers of insured banks and proposed
acquisitions by bank holding companies must be
approved by a federal banking regulator. The review of
the proposal is conducted by the regulatory agency that
would be the primary regulator for the surviving banking
institution. If the resulting institution would be a national
bank, the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency
reviews the proposal. If it would be a state-chartered
bank that is not a member of the Federal Reserve System,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reviews the
proposal. And if the proposal involves an acquisition by a
bank holding company or the resulting bank would be a
state-chartered member of the Federal Reserve System,
the Federal Reserve is the reviewer. The Department of
Justice, which has general enforcement authority under
federal antitrust laws, reviews proposed mergers and
acquisitions approved by the banking regulators.
Proposals for banking consolidations are reviewed
under two primary federal statutes, the Bank Merger Act
of 1960 (as amended in 1966) and the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 (as amended in 1970). The legal
standards applied by the banking regulators under these
statutes correspond to the standards set forth in the Sher-
man Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914.
Speciﬁcally, no bank merger or bank holding company
acquisition may be approved if the effect of the merger or
acquisition would be to create a monopoly (Sherman
Act) or may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in a particular market (Clayton Act).
Importantly, the Clayton Act does not deﬁne the term
‘‘substantially.’’ Court decisions, as well as the legislative
history of this act, however, make it clear that the term
must be examined in the context of each industry.The measurement of market concentration plays a
key role in the competitive analysis of proposed bank
mergers (see box ‘‘Concentration, the HHI, and the
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines’’). Gener-
ally, banking regulators and the Department of Jus-
tice intensively review any proposed merger that
would add signiﬁcantly to and result in a high degree
of market concentration. Importantly, concentration
indexes can be calculated using various types of data
depending on the type of product for which compe-
tition is being analyzed. The use of different data,
moreover, is likely to result in different calculated
levels of concentration. Thus, the choice of a product
market and the type of data used to measure concen-
tration could inﬂuence the regulatory outcome of a
merger proposal.
The new CRA data make it possible to consider
this second issue by examining the level of concentra-
tion within U.S. banking markets using a base other
than bank deposits, namely small business loan origi-
Concentration, the HHI, and the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
Market concentration is an important factor in the competi-
tive analyses of mergers and acquisitions conducted by
federal bank regulatory agencies and the Department of
Justice. Both theoretical models and empirical studies sug-
gest that higher levels of market concentration are generally
associated with less competition, higher prices, and greater
proﬁtability. These relationships are consistent with the
‘‘structure–conduct–performance’’ paradigm, which sug-
gests that there is a causal relationship between the structure
of a market (the number and size distribution of ﬁrms
within a market and factors affecting the ability of new
ﬁrms to enter that market), the behavior of ﬁrms within that
market (competition, collusion, or other competitive strate-
gies), and the performance of ﬁrms in that market (typically,
proﬁts, prices, or ﬁrm growth).
The Department of Justice has for many years published
formal guidelines that identify structural changes resulting
from mergers that are likely to cause the department to
challenge a merger. Since 1982, the department has based
its merger guidelines on the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index of
concentration (HHI). This measure, which is also used by
the bank regulatory agencies, is calculated by squaring the
market share of each ﬁrm competing in a deﬁned geo-
graphic banking market and then summing the squares. The
HHI can range from zero in a market having an inﬁnite
number of ﬁrms to 10,000 in a market having just one ﬁrm
(with a 100 percent market share).1
The HHI is a static measure and, therefore, gauges mar-
ket concentration at a single point in time. Algebraically, it
can be depicted as
HHI = S (MSi)2
n
i =1
where MS is the market share of the ith ﬁrm and n is the
number of ﬁrms in the market.
The HHI is a particularly useful tool for bank merger
analysis because it accounts for the presence of every
competitor in a market and provides a measure of the
1. A more complete discussion of the HHI is presented in Stephen A.
Rhoades, ‘‘The Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin,
vol. 79 (March 1993), pp.188–89.
structural effect of a merger of any ﬁrms in a market. In
addition, the squaring of market shares gives greater weight
to ﬁrms that have large market shares. This weighting of the
largest competitors in a market is consistent with economic
theories that predict weak competition in markets in which
a few competitors hold a large combined market share.
A merger of two banking competitors will increase the
HHI in their shared market. (Mathematically, the increase is
equal to the product of the two ﬁrms’ market shares times
two.) The amount of the increase and the level to which the
HHI would rise after the merger are key elements in the
structural analysis of bank mergers. In the Department of
Justice’s guidelines, markets with an HHI of less than 1000
are considered ‘‘unconcentrated’’; those with an HHI of
1000 to 1800 are ‘‘moderately concentrated’’; and those
with an HHI greater than 1800 are ‘‘highly concentrated.’’
The department’s merger guidelines for nonbanking
industries generally indicate that a merger that increases the
HHI 50 points or less in a highly concentrated market is
unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily
would not be challenged on antitrust grounds. The depart-
ment’s guidelines for the banking industry are more lenient,
largely in recognition of the widespread presence of non-
banking providers of ﬁnancial services. In particular, in
1985, the department stated that it would not ordinarily
challenge a proposed bank merger unless the rise in the HHI
would be more than 200 points in a highly concentrated
market. This practice was subsequently adopted by the
Federal Reserve System as part of its Rules Regarding
Delegation of Authority, an administrative procedure that
allows certain mergers to be approved directly by the
Reserve Banks. (Proposed bank mergers that raise substan-
tive issues must normally be acted upon by the Board of
Governors following a formal review and voting process.)
Although these structural guidelines constitute a critical
screening device for the Department of Justice and the
banking regulators, the analysis of other economic factors is
also an integral part of the assessment of the competitive
effects of consolidation. These factors can include, for
example, market economic conditions, trends in concentra-
tion, and the competitiveness of other banking and thrift
institutions.
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whether, on average, antitrust standards are likely to
be more or less difﬁcult to meet when concentration
measures are based on small business loans rather
than on deposits.
OVERVIEW OF BANKING ANTITRUST POLICY
Antitrust policy in the United States generally recog-
nizes that competition results in lower prices and
better service for consumers. Thus, a primary goal of
banking antitrust policy is to prevent the creation of,
or an increase in, market power such that a ﬁrm could
impose above-competitive prices and earn excess
proﬁts at the expense of consumers.
Mergers in the banking industry are subject to
the same antitrust standards as are mergers in other
industries. This principle was made clear by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its 1963 decision involving the
proposed merger of two competing Philadelphia
banking institutions.3 In that case (Philadelphia
National Bank) the Court made three ﬁndings that
have become fundamental tenets of banking antitrust
policy in the United States. First, antitrust laws apply
to banking mergers, and the legal standards for judg-
ing mergers in the banking industry are the same as
those embodied in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
and the Clayton Act of 1914. Second, commercial
banking is a distinct line of commerce in which banks
provide a unique ‘‘cluster’’ of products and services
not provided by any other type of ﬁnancial institu-
tion.4 Third, commercial banks compete in local mar-
kets, primarily because of their need to provide con-
venient service to their customers.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court vali-
dated the ‘‘structural’’ approach to analyzing the
competitive effects of bank mergers. In this approach,
the likely competitive effect of a proposed bank
merger is presumed to be indicated by the merger’s
effect on such structural variables as market concen-
tration, market shares, and the number of competitors
in the banking market.5 The structural approach
requires that both a product market and a geographic
market be deﬁned in order to determine whether
the merging banks provide substitutable products to
essentially the same group of customers. If they do, it
can be assumed that they operate within the same
product and geographic markets and that their merger
would lessen competition.
For such mergers, regulators must then determine
whether the loss of competition may be substantial.
Generally, the expected loss of competition is
assumed to be serious if the market share of the
surviving bank would increase signiﬁcantly, to a high
level, and if the merger would increase market
concentration substantially, to a high level. In such
a case, banking regulators would be unlikely to
approve the merger unless signiﬁcant mitigating
factors were present. Even if such a merger were
approved by a bank regulatory agency, it could be
challenged by the Department of Justice. To mini-
mize regulatory uncertainty and to provide a more
consistent interpretation of merger-induced structural
changes within banking markets, the Department of
Justice has for many years published formal guide-
lines that indicate which mergers are likely to exceed
its antitrust standards. To a large extent, the banking
regulators have adopted these standards as part of
their merger analyses.
A signiﬁcant aspect of Philadelphia National Bank
was that it established legal precedents for deﬁning a
single product market (the ‘‘cluster’’ of products and
services) and for deﬁning geographic banking mar-
kets as being local in extent. Since 1963, these deﬁni-
tions have been used widely and have been supported
by both agency and court decisions.6 However, the
deﬁnitions have been controversial, particularly in
recent years as the number of nonbank ﬁrms that
provide bank-like ﬁnancial products on a nationwide
basis has increased. Some observers believe that the
relevant product market in banking is no longer a
single cluster of products and services provided only
by commercial banks. Nor do they believe that geo-
graphic banking markets are local in extent. Rather,
they argue, banks provide multiple and largely dis-
crete ﬁnancial products in broad geographic markets
that in some instances are national in extent. Not
surprisingly, some of these observers believe that a
banking antitrust policy based on the cluster product
market and local geographic markets is no longer
relevant and does not reﬂect competitive realities.
Above all, they argue, current policy may be unduly
restrictive.
3. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963).
4. The Court noted that, among other products and services,
demand deposits, trust administration, and various types of credit such
as commercial lending are uniquely supplied by commercial banks
and constitute key elements of the banking cluster.
5. Other approaches to merger analysis may emphasize the likely
effects on the behavior of the merger participants and may exam-
ine business strategy, activity, and pricing as guides to assessing
competition.
6. See, for example, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418
U.S. 602 (1974); and United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp.
1276, 1292 (W.D. Mich., 1985), Aff’d 817 F.2d, 22 (6th Cir., 1987).
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Federal banking regulators and the Department of
Justice commonly take the structural approach in
assessing the competitive effects of proposed bank
mergers, and their methods of analysis are generally
similar. Some differences exist, however. One impor-
tant example is that the Federal Reserve continues to
deﬁne the product market as the ‘‘cluster’’ of prod-
ucts and services described in Philadelphia National
Bank, whereas the Department of Justice typically
disaggregates the product market into two or more
customer classes—usually banking services for con-
sumers and banking services for small businesses
(mainly lending).
The separation of customer classes typically results
in some differences in the way proposed mergers are
analyzed. Among the aspects of merger analysis that
may be affected are the deﬁnition of geographic
markets, the competitive role accorded thrift institu-
tions and nonbanking ﬁrms, and divestiture policy.
Perhaps most important, the separation of customer
classes affects the choice of data with which to calcu-
late concentration, a key variable in bank merger
analysis. In particular, whereas the Federal Reserve
relies on commercial bank and thrift deposits as the
measure of the cluster of products and services, the
Justice Department may use business lending and ser-
vices, or it may use commercial bank deposits only.
These differences in analytical methods stem
largely from differing assumptions about bank behav-
ior, consumer preferences, and the competitiveness of
banking markets. The use of deposits as a proxy for a
bank’s ability to provide the cluster of products and
services to customers embodies two key assumptions.
One assumption is that the product mix of a bank is a
matter of managerial prerogative, and that this mix,
which includes business loans, can be changed easily.
The other is that all banks within a geographic bank-
ing market inﬂuence the pricing of products, even if
they do not offer an identical range of products and
services.
The practice of disaggregating the product market
rests largely on the assumption that retail banking
services and business banking services (and possibly
others) are distinct products that face different supply
and demand conditions. For example, competition
to provide the ﬁnancial services used by small busi-
nesses (primarily small business lending) is often
regarded as weaker and more locally limited than
competition to provide the retail services used by
households. Thus, mergers that affect competition
within the business customer class may require closer
antitrust scrutiny.
THE CRA DATA
The data on small business loans used in this analysis
came primarily from depository institutions report-
ing under the Community Reinvestment Act—
independent commercial banks and savings institu-
tions (savings banks and savings and loan associa-
tions) with total assets of $250 million or more and
institutions of any size if owned by a holding com-
pany with total assets of $1 billion or more.7 The
CRA data cover the 1996 originations of small busi-
ness loans by 1,871 institutions—1,460 commercial
banks and 411 savings institutions.8 These institu-
tions (‘‘CRA reporters’’), which constitute 16 percent
of all U.S. commercial banks and savings institu-
tions, reported having originated 2.4 million small
business loans in 1996 totaling $145 billion. These
loans accounted for about two-thirds of the total
dollar volume of small business loans made by all
depository institutions in the United States in that
year.
Included among the CRA reporters are banks
whose primary activity is credit card lending. Twelve
credit card banks reported having originated credit
card small business loans in 1996.9 These insti-
tutions, though small in number, can have a large
effect on analytical results, particularly in urban
markets. Overall, they accounted for 30 percent of
all small business loans reported under the CRA,
though only 2.9 percent of the dollar volume of such
loans.
The CRA loan data are geocoded, that is, reported
by geographic location of the borrower (census tract
or block number area), making it possible to aggre-
7. Some loan data came from other sources; see footnote 11.
For additional information on the new CRA data, see Raphael W.
Bostic and Glenn B. Canner, ‘‘New Information on Lending to Small
Businesses and Small Farms: The 1996 CRA Data,’’ Federal Reserve
Bulletin, vol. 84 (January 1998), pp. 1–21.
8. Small business loans are deﬁned as commercial and industrial
loans having an original amount of $1 million or less. This deﬁnition
of a small business loan for CRA purposes is the same as that used for
the Report of Condition and Income (Call Report), the quarterly report
submitted by banks to their primary regulator and the FDIC, and for
the Thrift Financial Report, the quarterly report submitted by savings
and loan associations to the Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision. By focusing
on loan amount, the term refers to a small loan made to a business of
any size; such a loan may or may not be a loan to a small business.
See box ‘‘When Is a Small Business Loan Not a Loan to a Small
Business?’’
9. The CRA regulations direct institutions that issue credit cards to
the employees of small businesses to report all of the credit card lines
opened on a particular day as a single business loan, with the ‘‘amount
of the loan’’ equivalent to the sum of the available credit lines of those
credit card accounts opened on that day.
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CRA reporters by geographic market.10
SMALL BUSINESS LENDING ACTIVITY
The CRA data for urban and rural markets were
analyzed separately because such markets generally
have different economic characteristics, structures,
and degrees of competition.
Urban Markets
Much of the merger activity in recent years has been
in large metropolitan banking markets. Proponents of
mergers often argue that out-of-market lenders are an
important source of small business credit in these
large markets but that their inﬂuence on competition
is largely overlooked. To assess the competitive
importance of out-of-market lenders in these markets,
the data were aggregated across metropolitan statisti-
cal areas (MSAs)—the 313 urban population centers
in the United States that are frequently used in eco-
nomic research and merger analysis as approxima-
tions for urban geographic banking markets.
Presence of Small Business CRA Lenders
Every MSA has at least one in-market institution
reporting small business lending (CRA reporter), and
these reporters constitute a sizable proportion of the
total number of institutions within these markets
(table 1).11 Perhaps more important, the average num-
ber of out-of-market reporters in MSAs of all sizes is
quite large relative to the number of all in-market
institutions. In fact, for all but the largest MSA size
category, the number of out-of-market CRA reporters
exceeds the number of in-market ﬁrms. This is a
potentially important ﬁnding because it supports the
claims of some merger advocates that, on average, a
relatively large number of out-of-market banks and
10. In addition, CRA reporters must indicate the number and dollar
volume of their small business loans by size class ($100,000 or less,
$100,001–$250,000, or $250,001–$1 million) and the number and
dollar volume of loans to ﬁrms having annual revenues of $1 million
or less.
11. Data for institutions not reporting small business loans under
the Community Reinvestment Act (‘‘nonreporters’’) were taken from
or derived from the Call Report, the Thrift Financial Report, and the
Summary of Deposits report (which is submitted both by banks and by
savings and loan associations to their primary regulator and the
FDIC). Population data used to categorize both urban and rural
markets by size were derived from 1994 regional economic accounts,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
When Is a Small Business Loan Not a Loan
to a Small Business?
‘‘Small business loans’’ are often not loans to small
businesses but, rather, small loans to businesses that are
quite large. This distinction can be important to policy-
makers seeking to preserve or create credit opportunities
for small ﬁrms.
For this article, small business loans are deﬁned as
they are for reporting by lenders under the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA reporters)—commercial and
industrial loans of $1 million or less extended to busi-
nesses of any size. However, because CRA reporters
must indicate separately the number and dollar volume
of small business loans made to ﬁrms having annual
revenues of $1 million or less, the data can be used to
determine the proportion of small business loans made to
small businesses (when a small business is deﬁned as one
having annual revenues of $1 million or less).1
In urban markets, 54.4 percent of small business loans
originated in 1996 by CRA reporters were made to
‘‘small’’ ﬁrms. In-market CRA reporters made 60 percent
of their small business loans to small ﬁrms, compared
with only 47 percent for out-of-market CRA lenders.
Thus, it appears that out-of-market lenders make a greater
proportion of their small business loans to ‘‘large’’ ﬁrms
(those having annual revenues of more than $1 million).
One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that ﬁrms
eventually outgrow their local banking institutions and
need to go out of market to obtain ﬁnancing, particularly
when they are in small markets. For CRA reporters as a
group, the proportion of small business loans extended
to ﬁrms having annual revenues of $1 million or less
increases as market population decreases. This inverse
relationship probably reﬂects the relative scarcity of large
businesses in smaller markets.
Similar results were found for rural markets; however,
the proportion of small business loans made to small
ﬁrms across rural markets of all sizes was somewhat
higher. In rural markets, CRA reporters made 68 percent
of their small business loans to ﬁrms having annual
revenues of $1 million or less. As with urban markets,
in-market reporters made a higher proportion of their
small business loans to smaller ﬁrms (78 percent) than
did out-of-market CRA reporters (45 percent). Also as
with urban markets, the data generally show an inverse
relationship between market population and the propor-
tion of small business loans extended to small ﬁrms.
1. There is no commonly accepted criterion deﬁning a ‘‘small busi-
ness.’’ The 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances (sponsored
by the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Small Business Administra-
tion), which deﬁnes small businesses as those having fewer than 500
employees, notes that about 84 percent of all small businesses have
annual revenues of less than $1 million. For a discussion of that survey,
see Rebel A Cole, John D. Wolken, and R. Louise Woodburn, ‘‘Bank and
Nonbank Competition for Small Business Credit: Evidence from the 1987
and 1993 National Surveys of Small Business Finances,’’ Federal Reserve
Bulletin, vol. 82 (November 1996), pp. 983–95.
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urban markets.
Of course, the mere presence of out-of-market
small business lenders—even in large relative
numbers—does not necessarily demonstrate that such
ﬁrms are an important competitive force within urban
markets. They may have a relatively small presence
in terms of number or dollar volume of small busi-
ness loans originated.
Number of Loans
Although in-market CRA reporters typically consti-
tute less than half of all in-market ﬁrms (table 1, ﬁrst
memo item), these reporters, in each MSA size cate-
gory, account for about two-thirds of the estimated
number of small business loans made by all in-market
ﬁrms (table 2).12 The dominance of in-market CRA
reporters is not particularly surprising: Because of
the asset-size criteria for reporting under the CRA,
reporters tend to be the larger ﬁrms within banking
markets—and in many markets these institutions are
the most active small business lenders.
A more important observation is that the average
number of small business loans originated by out-
of-market reporters is, for each MSA size category,
considerably smaller than the average number of
small business loans originated by in-market ﬁrms.
This result is noteworthy because out-of-market lend-
ers outnumber in-market lenders in all but one MSA
size category (table 1). Thus, out-of-market CRA
12. Small business loan originations by each in-market nonreporter
were estimated by (1) multiplying the ratio of its small business loans
outstanding to its deposits by its local, in-market deposits and then
(2) multiplying that product by 60 percent, the approximate ratio of
small business loan originations to small business loans outstanding
for all CRA reporters.
lenders account for a considerably smaller number of
loans than might be suggested by their presence
relative to in-market ﬁrms.
Interestingly, not only is the share of small busi-
ness loans originated by out-of-market reporters con-
siderably less than that originated by in-market ﬁrms
(in terms of number made), but this market share
decreases steadily as the population of the MSA
decreases. The data show, therefore, that as urban
markets decrease in population, so does the impor-
tance of out-of-market lenders, as measured by their
share of the small business loans originated. As will
be seen later, this relationship also exists for rural
markets of different sizes.
The direct relationship between market population
and the market share of out-of-market ﬁrms has sev-
eral possible explanations. One is that out-of-market
lenders simply view smaller markets as being poten-
tially less proﬁtable and, therefore, expend relatively
less effort on developing a lending business in such
markets. Another is that businesses in small markets
have strong and long-standing ties to local lenders
that are not easily competed away by out-of-market
ﬁrms. A number of observers have noted that the
credit conditions faced by a small business are likely
to be inﬂuenced by the nature of the borrower–lender
relationship. In particular, when credit relationships
are of long standing, lenders are likely to have better
information about borrowers, and this knowledge
may result in more favorable terms on business loans.
Thus, a small business borrower probably has an
incentive (in addition to convenience) to develop and
maintain a close relationship with a lender that is
based in its banking market.13
13. This issue was recently discussed in Katherine Samolyk,
‘‘Small Business Credit Markets: Why Do We Know So Little about
Them?’’ FDIC Banking Review, vol. 10, no. 2 (1997), pp. 14–32.
1. Average number of selected types of lending institutions per urban market, by type of institution and size of market, 1996




5,000 1,000–5,000 500–999 250–499 Less than
250
All in-market institutions .................... 203 60 28 19 13 27
In-market CRA reporters .................... 58 18 11 9 6 10
Out-of-market CRA reporters ................ 105 65 39 27 19 32
Excluding credit card banks ............... 103 63 37 25 17 30
Memo
Ratio of in-market CRA reporters to all
in-market institutions ................... .29 .30 .39 .47 .46 .37
Ratio of out-of-market CRA reporters to all
in-market institutions ................... .52 1.08 1.39 1.42 1.46 1.19
Ratio of out-of-market CRA reporters to all
institutions1 ............................ .34 .52 .58 .59 .59 .54
Number of markets .......................... 4 51 42 70 146 313
Note. Urban markets are metropolitan statistical areas as deﬁned by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. All markets have at least one in-market CRA
reporter.
1. Denominator is all in-market institutions plus out-of-market CRA
reporters.
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card banks are deducted from the out-of-market
totals, the number of loans made by out-of-market
CRA lenders falls sharply (table 2). For example, in
the largest MSAs, the average number of small busi-
ness loans by out-of-market ﬁrms drops from 29,579
to only 4,728. All other MSA size categories exhibit
similar proportional declines.
The effect of these declines, not surprisingly, is to
substantially reduce the market shares held by out-of-
market CRA reporters. For example, for the largest
MSAs, the share of small business loans originated
by out-of-market ﬁrms declines from 40 percent to
just 10 percent when credit card banks are excluded.
Similar sharp declines occur for all other MSA size
categories. For all MSAs combined, the share
declines from 31 percent to just 8 percent.
The competitive signiﬁcance of credit card banks
is not clear. The new CRA data do indicate that they
account, on average, for a signiﬁcant proportion of
small business loans within urban markets. However,
whether a credit card small business loan is the
functional and competitive equivalent of other small
business loans is arguable. Certainly, national sur-
veys of small business lending have demonstrated
that many small businesses regularly use credit cards
as a source of credit. However, several factors sug-
gest that credit card loans may differ from other small
business loans. For example, the average credit card
loan is considerably smaller, and the credit standards
associated with credit card loans may not be as strin-
gent as those for conventional small business loans.
Dollar Volume of Loans
The average dollar volume of small business loan
originations within MSAs declines as MSA popu-
lation decreases (table 3). This pattern reﬂects the
lower absolute level of aggregate loan demand typi-
cally associated with smaller banking markets.
A large proportion of the dollar volume of small
business lending by in-market ﬁrms is accounted for
by in-market CRA reporters (ﬁrst memo item). This
ﬁnding is noteworthy because it suggests that the
small business lending activity of all banks and sav-
ings associations based within urban markets can be
approximated rather closely by using only data from
CRA reporters. For example, for all MSAs com-
bined, in-market CRA reporters accounted for 88 per-
cent of the average dollar volume of all small busi-
ness loans originated by in-market lenders (though
they originated only 68 percent of the number of such
loans across all MSAs).
Perhaps the most important observation from the
data in table 3 is that out-of-market CRA reporters
account, on average, for a relatively small proportion
of the dollar volume of small business lending in
urban markets (third memo item). This ﬁnding is
somewhat surprising, given that out-of-market CRA
reporters generally outnumber in-market ﬁrms in
urban markets and account for a sizable proportion
of small business loans in these markets by number.
Across all MSAs, the average volume of small
business lending by all in-market ﬁrms in 1996 was
$388.5 million, compared with only $32.8 million for
out-of-market CRA reporters. Thus, out-of-market
CRA reporters accounted, on average, for only 8 per-
cent of the average dollar volume of small business
loan originations across all MSAs (third memo item).
This small market share in terms of dollar volume
contrasts sharply with the share held by out-of-
market CRA reporters in terms of number of loans
(31 percent, table 2) and their relative presence in
urban markets (54 percent of lenders are out-of-
market CRA reporters, table 1). Similarly small dollar
shares are found for each MSA size category.
2. Average number of small business loans originated per urban market, by type of lending institution
and size of market, 1996




5,000 1,000–5,000 500–999 250–499 Less than
250
All in-market institutions1 .................... 44,291 14,409 5,601 3,338 1,775 5,239
In-market CRA reporters ..................... 29,443 9,646 4,106 2,340 1,140 3,554
Out-of-market CRA reporters ................. 29,579 7,370 2,297 1,039 466 2,337
Excluding credit card banks ................ 4,728 1,321 504 244 121 454
Memo
Ratio of loans by in-market CRA reporters
to loans by all in-market institutions ...... .66 .67 .73 .70 .64 .68
Ratio of loans by out-of-market CRA reporters
to loans by all in-market institutions ...... .67 .51 .41 .31 .26 .45
Ratio of loans by out-of-market CRA reporters
to loans by all institutions 2 ............... .40 .34 .29 .24 .21 .31
Excluding credit card banks ............... .10 .08 .08 .07 .06 .08
Note. See general note to table 1.
1. Covers loans reported by CRA reporters and estimated loans by
nonreporters.
2. Denominator is loans made by all in-market institutions plus loans made
by out-of-market CRA reporters.
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important evidence regarding the competitive role of
out-of-market ﬁrms in such markets. Speciﬁcally, the
1996 CRA data show that out-of-market lenders are,
on average, both numerous and active small business
lenders compared with in-market ﬁrms. However,
these lenders account, on average, for only a small
proportion (typically 7 percent or 8 percent) of the
dollar volume of small business lending in MSAs of
various sizes. Moreover, when credit card banks are
excluded, the share of originations by out-of-market
CRA reporters, in terms of dollar volume, is even less
(typically 5 percent or 6 percent).
Rural Markets
Proposals for bank mergers in rural markets often
raise particularly serious antitrust issues. Typically,
rural markets are more highly concentrated than
urban markets and have relatively few competitors.
Many rural markets are not attractive for new entry
because of their small population and modest eco-
nomic prospects. Thus, any adverse competitive
effects resulting from a bank merger are likely to
persist. As in urban markets, however, parties to
proposed bank mergers frequently argue that com-
petition in rural markets is understated because the
regulatory agencies and the Department of Justice in
their analyses do not take into account the competi-
tive inﬂuence of out-of-market banks and savings
institutions.
The data considered here provide some evidence
relevant to this argument. In general, they are consis-
tent with the data for urban markets in that out-
of-market CRA reporters, on average, outnumber
in-market ﬁrms. In rural markets, however, out-of-
market CRA reporters account for a smaller propor-
tion of small business loan originations by num-
ber of loans, and a somewhat higher proportion by
dollar volume of loans. The higher proportion of
dollar lending suggests that out-of-market lenders
are a relatively more important source of competition
for small business lending in rural markets than in
urban markets.
Presence of Small Business CRA Lenders
The majority of rural markets (non-MSA counties
that have at least one banking or savings institution)
are quite small and have a population of less than
25,000 (table 4). A large proportion of these mar-
kets (68 percent) have at least one in-market CRA
reporter.
Rural markets, on average, have six in-market
banking and savings institutions, and two of the six
are CRA reporters. Not surprisingly, the number of
both in-market institutions and in-market CRA
reporters declines with market population.
The average number of out-of-market CRA report-
ers in rural markets (as in urban markets) is larger
than the average number of in-market institutions; for
example, for all rural markets, the average ratio of
out-of-market CRA reporters to all in-market ﬁrms is
1.67. Moreover, the ratio of out-of-market reporters
to in-market ﬁrms is inversely related to market size.
This relationship, which also characterizes urban
markets, indicates that out-of-market competitors
have a relatively greater presence in smaller markets
than in larger markets.
3. Average dollar volume of small business loans originated per urban market, by type of lending institution
and size of market, 1996
Millions of dollars




5,000 1,000–5,000 500–999 250–499 Less than
250
All in-market institutions1 ................... 3,973.8 1,119.5 415.7 224.2 105.6 388.5
In-market CRA reporters .................... 3,424.2 985.1 378.0 201.4 90.6 342.4
Out-of-market CRA reporters ................ 351.1 97.3 35.3 16.5 8.6 32.8
Excluding credit card banks ............... 214.9 65.9 26.1 12.5 7.0 23.0
Memo
Ratio of volume by in-market CRA reporters
to volume by all in-market institutions ... .86 .88 .91 .90 .86 .88
Ratio of volume by out-of-market CRA
reporters to volume by all in-market
institutions ............................. .09 .09 .08 .07 .08 .08
Ratio of volume by out-of-market CRA
reporters to volume by all institutions 2 .. .08 .08 .08 .07 .08 .08
Excluding credit card banks ............... .05 .06 .06 .05 .06 .06
Note. See general note to table 1.
1. Covers loans reported by CRA reporters and estimated loans by
nonreporters.
2. Denominator is volume of loans made by all in-market institutions plus
volume made by out-of-market CRA reporters.
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The relative number of small business loans made by
in-market and out-of-market lenders is a potentially
important gauge for determining the level of compe-
tition in a banking market. For rural markets, as for
urban markets, the number of small business loans
originated in 1996 diminished with market popula-
tion (table 5). This pattern most likely reﬂects the
lower loan demand associated with smaller markets
and fewer business borrowers of all sizes.
The proportion of in-market loans originated by
in-market CRA lenders declines as market population
decreases (ﬁrst memo item). For example, the propor-
tion of in-market loans made by in-market CRA
lenders is 0.65 for the largest rural markets, com-
pared with 0.44 for the smallest rural markets. For all
rural markets, the ratio is 0.51, somewhat smaller
than the 0.68 ratio for urban markets (table 2).
The share of small business loans made by out-of-
market CRA reporters generally declines as market
population decreases (table 5, third memo item). This
ﬁnding is somewhat surprising, given that the num-
ber of such ﬁrms relative to the total number of
in-market institutions increases as market population
decreases (table 4, second memo item). This relation-
ship, which also exists for urban markets, may reﬂect
a preference by small ﬁrms in small, more concen-
trated markets to borrow from local institutions.
Dollar Volume of Loans
As in urban markets, in-market CRA reporters
account for most of the dollar volume of small busi-
ness lending by in-market institutions in rural mar-
kets, averaging 74 percent across all rural markets
(table 6). However, the relative volume of lending by
4. Average number of selected types of lending institutions per rural market, by type of institution and size of market, 1996




More than 100 50–100 25–49 Less than 25
In-market institutions ........................ 12 9 7 4 6
In-market CRA reporters .................... 6 4 3 2 2
Out-of-market CRA reporters ................ 18 14 12 8 10
Excluding credit card banks ............... 16 12 10 7 8
Memo
Ratio of in-market CRA reporters to all
in-market institutions ................... .50 .44 .43 .50 .33
Ratio of out-of-market CRA reporters to all
in-market institutions ................... 1.50 1.56 1.71 2.00 1.67
Ratio of out-of-market CRA reporters to all
institutions 1 ............................ .60 .61 .63 .67 .63
Number of markets .......................... 26 199 485 1,561 2,271
Number of markets with an in-market CRA
reporter ................................ 26 195 450 881 1,552
Note. Rural markets are non-MSA counties that have at least one banking or
savings institution. Data are for rural markets that have at least one CRA
reporter.
1. Denominator is all in-market institutions plus out-of-market CRA
reporters.
5. Average number of small business loans originated per rural market, by type of lending institution
and size of market, 1996




More than 100 50–100 25–49 Less than 25
All in-market institutions1 ..................... 961 870 507 213 398
In-market CRA reporters ...................... 625 514 236 94 201
Out-of-market CRA reporters .................. 366 185 92 40 80
Excluding credit card banks ................. 106 64 44 22 36
Memo
Ratio of loans by in-market CRA reporters
to loans by all in-market institutions ....... .65 .59 .47 .44 .51
Ratio of loans by out-of-market CRA reporters
to loans by all in-market institutions ....... .38 .21 .18 .19 .20
Ratio of loans by out-of-market CRA reporters
to loans by all institutions 2 ................ .28 .18 .15 .16 .17
Excluding credit card banks ................. .10 .07 .08 .09 .08
Note. See general note to table 4.
1. Covers loans reported by CRA reporters and estimated loans by
nonreporters.
2. Denominator is loans made by all in-market institutions plus loans made
by out-of-market CRA reporters.
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rural markets than in urban markets. Out-of-market
CRA reporters account, overall, for 14 percent of the
average dollar volume of small business lending in
rural markets (third memo item), compared with
8 percent in urban markets (table 3). In the smallest
rural markets, out-of-market CRA reporters account
for an average of 19 percent of the volume of small
business loans.
Importance of Out-of-Market CRA Lenders
An overall judgment as to whether out-of-market
CRA lenders are an important competitive force
within local banking markets (that is, are able to
affect prices and services) is difﬁcult to make and is a
matter for additional research. The data indicate that
in both urban and rural markets, the average number
of out-of-market CRA reporters, relative to the aver-
age number of in-market institutions, is not trivial. In
urban markets, out-of-market CRA lenders constitute
54 percent of all institutions that extend small busi-
ness loans, in rural markets, 63 percent. Out-of-
market CRA lenders also account for a sizable pro-
portion of small business loans, by number, in local
banking markets—an average of 31 percent in urban
markets and 17 percent in rural markets—though
these percentages fall sharply when credit card banks
are excluded.
Out-of-market reporters seem to be less signiﬁcant
when small business lending is measured by dollar
volume. In urban markets, they account for only
8 percent of small business loan volume, including
loans by credit card banks; in rural markets, they
appear to be more important, accounting, on aver-
age, for about 14 percent of small business lending
volume.
SMALL BUSINESS LOAN CONCENTRATION
Indexes of concentration, as noted earlier, are a key
component of the competitive analyses of bank merg-
ers conducted by the bank regulatory agencies and
the Department of Justice (see box on concentration
and the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index). The new CRA
data enable the construction of concentration indexes
based on small business loan originations and the
comparison of these indexes with more traditional
indexes based on bank deposits. An analysis of these
concentration measures provides evidence that is rele-
vant to the competitive analysis of bank mergers.
Urban Markets
HHIs for urban markets were calculated in four ways.
Two of the measures were based on deposits, and two
were based on small business loan originations. One
of the deposits-based HHIs was calculated using the
deposits of commercial banking institutions only—
the measure often used by the Department of Justice
to approximate concentration in small business loan
markets. The other deposits-based measure, ‘‘stan-
dard deposits,’’ was calculated using commercial
bank deposits plus 50 percent of thrift institution
(savings association) deposits—the measure typically
used by the Federal Reserve. A portion of thrift
institution deposits are included in the latter measure
because these institutions generally provide competi-
6. Average dollar volume of small business loans originated per rural market, by type of lending institution
and size of market, 1996
Millions of dollars




More than 100 50–100 25–49 Less than 25
All in-market institutions1 ................... 53.8 43.7 18.5 6.3 15.6
In-market CRA reporters .................... 46.8 35.5 13.0 4.0 11.5
Out-of-market CRA reporters ................ 7.7 4.9 3.1 1.5 2.5
Excluding credit card banks ............... 6.3 4.3 2.9 1.4 2.3
Memo
Ratio of volume by in-market CRA reporters
to volume by all in-market institutions ... .87 .81 .70 .63 .74
Ratio of volume by out-of-market CRA
reporters to volume by all in-market
institutions ............................. .14 .11 .17 .24 .16
Ratio of volume by out-of-market CRA
reporters to volume by all institutions 2 .. .13 .10 .14 .19 .14
Excluding credit card banks ............... .10 .09 .14 .18 .13
Note. See general note to table 4.
1. Covers loans reported by CRA reporters and estimated loans by
nonreporters.
2. Denominator is volume of loans made by all in-market institutions plus
volume made by out-of-market CRA reporters.
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ucts, namely banking services for households; in
many cases they provide little or no competition for
small business services.
One of the loan-based HHIs was calculated using
the dollar volume of loans originated by only
in-market institutions, including CRA reporters and
nonreporters. The other was calculated using the
dollar volume of loans originated by in-market insti-
tutions plus out-of-market CRA reporters. A compari-
son of the two indexes provides a measure of the
average effect of out-of-market lenders on small busi-
ness loan concentration.
In all but one instance, concentration rises as urban
market population declines (table 7). This is a com-
mon ﬁnding and reﬂects the tendency of smaller
markets to have fewer banking ﬁrms, each holding a
relatively large individual market share. And, as dis-
cussed in the box on concentration and the HHI, the
mathematical properties of the HHI are such that
large individual market shares have the effect of
rapidly increasing the level of the HHI.
The inclusion of thrift deposits causes the average
HHI to decline substantially from the level of the
banks-only HHI. For example, for all urban markets,
the average banks-only HHI is 1991 and the average
standard-deposits HHI is 1639.
The disparity between the average banks-only and
standard-deposits HHIs across all urban markets calls
attention to the analytical differences between the
Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. The Department of Justice has often used the
banks-only HHI as a proxy for small business
loan competition but has only occasionally included
thrift institutions in its HHI calculations. The Fed-
eral Reserve, in contrast, typically includes 50 per-
cent of thrift deposits in its calculations of concentra-
tion. Thus, for any bank merger proposal, these two
antitrust authorities can have different initial percep-
tions of market concentration.
The data also show that the loan-based HHIs are
smaller than the deposits-based HHIs for the largest
urban markets but increase rapidly as population
decreases and exceed the deposits-based HHIs for the
smaller urban markets. Signiﬁcantly, the inclusion of
originations by out-of-market CRA reporters has a
pronounced effect in lowering the level of loan con-
centration for urban markets. For all urban mar-
kets, for instance, the average loan-based HHI falls
from 2130 to 1816 when out-of-market lenders are
included. This ﬁnding further supports the notion that
out-of-market lenders may inﬂuence concentration
and competition in urban banking markets. Their
importance in reducing loan concentration, moreover,
appears to increase as market population decreases.
Comparable declines occur for all but the largest size
category of urban markets.
Rural Markets
Because very high HHI values are typical for markets
with fewer than four competitors, the HHIs for rural
markets were calculated in two ways—for markets
with one or more institutions and for those with four
or more institutions (table 8). The ﬁndings are similar
to those for urban markets: Higher levels of the HHI,
both deposits-based and loan-based, are associated
with progressively smaller markets; the effect of
including out-of-market CRA lenders in the loan-
based HHIs is pronounced; and as the population of
the market decreases, the deconcentrating effect of
out-of-market lenders appears to increase.
Effects of Data Choice on Measures
of Market Concentration
In general, the proportion of urban markets that are
highly concentrated (HHI above 1800) or very highly
7. Average HHI in urban markets, by basis for calculation and size of market, 1996




More than 5,000 1,000–5,000 500–999 250–499 Less than 250
Dollar volume of deposits
Banks-only total deposits .................... 1505 1812 1885 1829 2170 1991
Standard deposits1 ........................... 1009 1360 1528 1560 1815 1639
Dollar volume of loans
Small business loan originations by all
in-market institutions 2 .................. 678 1364 1707 2006 2617 2130
Small business loan originations by all
institutions 3 ............................ 576 1160 1443 1743 2220 1816
1. Commercial bank deposits plus 50 percent of thrift institution deposits.
2. Covers loans reported by CRA reporters and estimated loans by
nonreporters.
3. Covers loans made by all in-market institutions and by out-of-market CRA
reporters.
Bank Merger Policy and the New CRA Data 713concentrated (HHI above 2200) can vary consider-
ably depending on the choice of data used in the HHI
calculation (table 9). In rural markets, however, the
choice of data matters much less because the vast
majority of rural markets are highly concentrated
regardless of which of the four HHI measures is
considered.
In both urban and rural markets, the standard-
deposits HHI generates the largest proportion of
unconcentrated or moderately concentrated markets
(HHI of 1800 or less). For example, 64 percent of
urban markets are so rated when HHIs are calculated
using bank deposits plus 50 percent of thrift deposits,
compared with only 46 percent when only bank
deposits are used.
Urban markets are most concentrated when cal-
culations are based on the small business lending
of in-market lenders. For example, 60 percent of all
urban markets are highly or very highly concentrated
when HHIs are based on the dollar volume of small
business loans originated by in-market institutions.
The proportion falls to 43 percent when small busi-
ness loans originated by out-of-market CRA report-
ers are included. The same general relationship exists
for rural markets, but the vast majority of these
markets are very highly concentrated regardless of
the way the HHI is measured.
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Overall, the new CRA data provide support for the
view that out-of-market lenders may be an important
source of small business lending in many markets.
The data indicate that out-of-market lenders are rela-
tively numerous throughout both urban and rural
banking markets, and in most markets they outnum-
ber in-market institutions. Also, in many markets,
out-of-market lenders appear to account for a sizable
proportion of small business loans, by number,
although their share of such loans declines steadily
with market population. Notably, if the loans of credit
card banks are excluded, the average market share of
loans provided by out-of-market lenders declines to
half or less, suggesting that credit card loans account
for a large proportion of the lending activity of out-
of-market reporters.
8. Average HHI in rural markets, by basis for calculation, number of institutions in market, and size of market, 1996
Basis for calculating HHI and




More than 100 50–100 25–49 Less than 25
Dollar volume of deposits
Banks-only total deposits
One or more institutions ................... 2681 2556 2888 4784 4145
Four or more institutions .................. 2660 2530 2810 3172 2955
Standard deposits
One or more institutions ................... 1968 2146 2532 4526 3844
Four or more institutions .................. 1964 2113 2452 2867 2611
Dollar volume of loans
Small business loan originations by all
in-market institutions
One or more institutions ................... 2580 3269 4425 6768 5812
Four or more institutions .................. 2580 3245 4306 5563 4756
Small business loan originations by all
institutions
One or more institutions ................... 2059 2581 3109 4453 3955
Four or more institutions .................. 2059 2575 3023 3734 3305
Note. See notes to table 7.
9. Percentage distribution of urban and rural markets by degree of concentration, 1996












Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Dollar volume of deposits
Banks-only total deposits ............ 4.2 .2 42.2 6.6 23.3 8.7 30.4 84.6
Standard deposits .................... 10.2 .3 54.0 11.0 20.8 11.2 15.0 77.5
Dollar volume of loans
Small business loan originations
by all in-market institutions ..... 4.8 8.5 35.1 .7 21.1 2.2 39.0 88.6
Small business loan originations
by all institutions ............... 13.4 * 43.5 5.9 14.4 9.7 28.8 84.3
Note. Distributions may not sum to 100 because of rounding. See notes to
table 7.
*Less than 0.05 percent.
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ers seems least signiﬁcant when the dollar volume of
loans extended by such ﬁrms is considered. In urban
markets, these ﬁrms account, on average, for about
8 percent of the dollar volume of small business
lending (6 percent if credit card banks are excluded).
In rural markets, their share is higher (14 percent
across all rural markets), suggesting that out-of-
market small business lenders may have a greater
inﬂuence on competition in rural markets than in
urban markets.
The competitive role played by out-of-market lend-
ers (as gauged by their presence, number of loans,
and dollar lending volume) is, however, quite vari-
able across individual markets. Thus, the competitive
impact of proposed mergers must be assessed on a
market-by-market basis. An important complement
to the analysis reported here would be research to
determine whether out-of-market lenders inﬂuence
loan rates and whether they extend credit to a broad
base of business borrowers within local markets.
Indexes of concentration based on the new CRA
data suggest that concentration for small business
loans is generally higher than concentration for
deposits, particularly in rural markets. However, HHI
levels can vary widely depending on the data under-
lying the index. On average, concentration is low-
est when HHIs are calculated using ‘‘standard
deposits’’—commercial bank deposits plus 50 per-
cent of thrift deposits—and highest when calculated
using the small business loan originations of only
in-market lenders.
Finally, it should be noted that the 1996 CRA data
used in this study are the ﬁrst of this sort to be
collected, and that data for later years could yield
different results. Also, in this study the small business
lending activity of nonreporting in-market institu-
tions, although believed to be only a small proportion
of overall lending activity in most markets, had to be
estimated. The ﬁndings also do not account for the
lending activity of out-of-market ﬁrms that are not
CRA reporters. Although nonreporters are smaller
institutions and are less likely to make loans in mar-
kets in which they do not have ofﬁces, the inclusion
of loans by these ﬁrms would probably have a further
moderating effect on loan-based HHIs. These limita-
tions notwithstanding, the new CRA data provide a
potentially valuable source of new information that is
likely to be helpful in the competitive analysis of
bank mergers.
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